

DRAFT (19 May 1960)

PROPAGANDA PROPOSITIONS

1. To prove the Russians are a menace.

Comment: This connotes that we are in eminent danger of Russian attack.

Conclusion: The selections do not prove that we are in eminent danger of attack.

2. The Russians are conceiving some diabolical new weapon system which can be used at their discretion to blackmail us into submission or to destroy us without warning.

Comment: The selections reveal no indication of some new diabolical weapon system nor indications that they have the flexibility to intimidate us nor to destroy us without warning.

Conclusion: Proposition not substantiated.

- ① 3. The USSR is making preparations in secret which we are making openly.

Comment: Case can be made for this provided each picture can be matched by an analogue from U.S. military buildup provided the pictures of the U.S. have previously been released to the press.


Conclusion: Proposition tends to ignore the question: Are these all of the U.S. preparations? Are there none secret apart from what is shown? Aren't some U.S. secrets beyond the ken of aerial photography? Isn't this also true of what's in Russia?

Conclusion: Proposition can be proved by selection of prints provided U.S. analogue photography is available but only to the extent implicit in the foregoing comment. Proposition is therefore subject to being shortlived.

1. - *offensive capability*

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
2. -



*Cont.*

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3. -



*an effect of defensive capability.*

4. U.S. achievement shows inspection by open skies is feasible.

Comment: If one wished to prove this point he could do so more effectively by planned low-level high-quality aerial photography of critical U.S. installations. Photography of Russian military preparedness is not essential<sup>3/14</sup> to prove the point.

Conclusion: Selection of photographs does not prove proposition.

② 5. U.S. has been defending free world by learning the extent of ☐ ILLEGIB  
ILLEGIB Russian preparedness, the ☐ trend of which is startling.

Comment: Selections could by themselves and by the inferences one is lead to draw that we are learning what the Russians are up to.

Comment: We could with some copy in addition to the pictures and by virtue of the high technical quality of the photography (which permits a layman to judge himself) show Russian preparedness to be startling in a longer term if not in terms of eminent danger.

Conclusion: Proposition can be fairly well substantiated.

③ 6 Proposition: The U.S. reconnaissance effort was not clumsy or ineffective.

Comment: Wide geographic selection of targets and prints of the photographs to critical preparedness installations permits the strong inference that the proposition is true.

Conclusion: Proposition provable.

7. Proposition: Publication can exacerbate internal high Russian power politics.

Comment: Khrushchev admitted that he has been unable till now to

frustrate U.S. reconnaissance efforts which already may be presumed to have created trouble at home and certain questions among neutral and allies as to Russian competence despite space proofs.

Display of materials made accelerate internal ~~to~~ USSR high political unrest. The concensus of which may or may not be favorable in the long run to the U.S. Such display would intensify some questioning of USSR's state of preparedness.

In later regard the effect could ~~be~~ lend some solace to those who questioned Russian preparedness capabilities.

Conclusion: Proposition fairly provable, but ultimate consensus bear close inspection.